The Wisdom of Bill James

Bill James is currently on the staff of the Boston Red Sox as a statistical guru. Before he was hired in 2002, he was well known for his Baseabll Abstract publications. These books used scientific methods to judge whether conventinal baseball wisdom held up when compared with cold, hard data. Mr. James has long had a profound impact on the game, influencing many GMs, including Oakland's Billy Beane.
I stumbled across some of James' ideas from his Baseball Abstract of twenty years ago. I thought I'd post them here so you can judge for yourself. Ask whether your favorite team seems to follow any of the strategies suggested by these ideas. Also, if you're a fantasy baseball owner, how can this information strengthen your team?

"What I wanted to write about... is a very basic question. Of all the studies I have done over the last 12 years, what have I learned? What is the relevance of sabermetric knowledge to the decision making process of a team? If I were employed by a major-league team, what are the basic things that I know from the research I have done which would be of use to me in helping that team?"

Minor league batting statistics will predict major league batting performance with essentially the same reliability as previous major league statistics.
(If this is true, and I believe it is --- then it pays to value minor league hitters more than minor league pitchers, since the results for hitters can be predicted with more success.)

Talent in baseball is not normally distributed. It is a pyramid. For every player who is 10 percent above the average player, there are probably twenty players who are 10 pecent below average.
(I also like to extend the letter designations of the minor leagues into the majors. For instance, I divide the majors into three different levels, based on talent and potential: 4A being the lowest, 5A the average talent level, and 6A being the all-star level.)

What a player hits in one ballpark may be radically different from what he would hit in another.
(I've often thought about this. Some ballparks not only have different dimensions, but different settings and backgrounds, too. These can have an impact on player performance. Ever see visiting players in Fenway Park trying to pull the ball, so they can hit the Green Monster?)

Ballplayers, as a group, reach their peak value much earlier and decline much more rapidly than people believe.


Players taken in the June draft coming out of college (or with at least two years of college) perform dramatically better than players drafted out of high school.
(This was a big part of the philosophy of the Oakland A's, which was documented in the best-selling book Moneyball.)

The chance of getting a good player with a high draft pick is substantial enough that it is clearly a disastrous strategy to give up a first round draft choice to sign a mediocre free agent. (see notes)
(If you look back at the Top Ten draft picks for the last 10 years or so, you will see a high percentage of players that went on to have good careers. I believe that this occurs in baseball more frequently than football or basketball, for instance.)

A power pitcher has a dramatically higher expectation for future wins than does a finesse picther of the same age and ability.
(I might take issue with this and say that other factors, such as control and movement also have a great effect on a pitcher's long-term success.)

Single season won-lost records have almost no value as an indicator of a pitcher's contribution to a team.

The largest variable determining how many runs a team will score is how many times they get their leadoff man on base.
(Note - James is referring to the leadoff man for each inning.)

A great deal of what is perceived as being pitching is in fact defense.
(Another Moneyball principle. It's a very interesting topic, and I believe, a primary reason why the Oakland A's have been able to put winning teams on the field almost every season.)

True shortage of talent almost never occurs at the left end of the defensive spectrum. (see notes)
(This seems failry obvious to me...most fielders can play a good first base if given the chance.)

Rightward shifts along the defensive spectrum almost never work. (see notes)

Our idea of what makes a team good on artificial turf is not supported by any research.
(I wonder if James has done more research on this topic.)

When a team improves sharply one season they will almost always decline in the next.
(The Detroit Tigers come to mind this year)

The platoon differential is real and virtually universal.

Notes:
Major league teams still must surrender choices in the amateur draft in exchange for signing free agents.

The defensive spectrum looks like this:
[ - - 1B - LF - RF - 3B - CF - 2B - SS - C - - ]
with the basic premise being that positions at the right end of
the spectrum are more difficult than the positions at the left
end of the spectrum. Players can generally move from right
to left along the specturm successfully during their careers.